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The New Fiction View of Models 
Fiora Salis 
 
Abstract 
How do models represent reality? There are two conditions that scientific models must 
satisfy to be representations of real systems, the aboutness condition and the epistemic 
condition. In this article, I critically assess the two main fictionalist theories of models as 
representations, the indirect fiction view and the direct fiction view, with respect to these 
conditions. And I develop a novel proposal, what I call ‘the new fiction view of models’. On 
this view, models are akin to fictional stories; they represent real-world phenomena if they 
stand in a denotation relation with reality; and they enable knowledge of reality via the 
generation of theoretical hypotheses, model–world comparisons and direct attributions.  
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1 Introduction 
Modern science crucially relies on descriptions of imaginary systems—or model systems—
that scientists study to learn about certain parts or aspects of the world—or target systems. 
An imaginary system is chosen as the object of study because it is less complex than its 
target and because by studying the model system we can learn about the target. This 
prompts the question of how scientific models represent. That is, what turns a description of 
© The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of 
Science. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com 
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2 
an imaginary system into a representation that enables drawing inferences about reality. In 
this article, I develop a new theory of model representations coherent with the original 
insight of the fiction view of models. The fiction view started from a natural analogy with 
the imaginary objects of literary fictions. Godfrey-Smith originally emphasized that 
‘modelers often treat model systems in a “concrete” way that suggests a strong analogy with 
ordinary fictions’ ([2006], p. 739), and that they often think of themselves as describing 
‘imaginary biological populations, imaginary neural networks, or imaginary economies’ that 
‘might be treated as similar to [...] the imagined objects of literary fiction’ ([2006], p. 735).  
The main motivation for the fiction view is a theoretical requirement that Frigg ([2010]) 
calls ‘naturalism’. According to naturalism, any account of how scientists learn with models 
should be able to explain scientific practice, or what Thomson-Jones ([2010]) calls the 
‘face-value practice’ of modelling. Thomson-Jones emphasizes that a model description 
‘has the surface appearance of an accurate description of an actual, concrete system (or kind 
of system) from the domain of inquiry’ (Thomson-Jones [2010], p. 284). There is no actual 
concrete object that fits the description and competent scientists know that. For example, the 
model description of the ideal pendulum seems to specify an imaginary system that is 
composed of a point mass and a string that is massless and unstretchable. The model 
description involves the attribution of properties that only concrete objects can have, such as 
being pulled, being released, and engaging in oscillatory movement. The model description 
seems to be about a particular concrete object, but there is no real object that satisfies the 
descriptive conditions stipulated by scientists. Yet, scientists think and talk as if there were 
such an imaginary object to be studied and explored and as if this imaginary object were a 
representation of some physical system.  
The main contemporary versions of the fiction view of models recognize the central 
role of imagination in the modelling practice and build on Walton’s ([1990]) notion of 
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3 
make-believe as a social imaginative activity (Frigg [2010]; Levy [2015]; Toon [2012]). 
Imagination is often construed as imagery, which is an ability to conjure up a perception-
like state, such as forming a mental image. However, Salis and Frigg ([forthcoming]) argue 
that the relevant sort of imagination involved in scientific models is make-believe, which 
they specifically construe as a variety of propositional imagination. Propositional 
imagination is an ability to conjure up alternative states of affairs, possibilities (or even 
impossibilities), and scenarios, which can but need not be accompanied by mental images. 
For example, when considering the model of the simple pendulum, one imagines that a point 
mass is suspended to a massless string, that the point mass oscillates in a uniform 
gravitational field, and that the point mass is not slowed down by friction. While imagining 
these propositions one need not also form mental images of a point mass, massless string, 
uniform gravitational field, or frictionless motion. All these notions are grasped through 
specific theoretical concepts that do not involve any mental images.  
There are two main strands of the fiction view, the indirect fiction view and the direct 
fiction view. The indirect view posits that model descriptions prescribe imagining about 
model systems, that model systems are akin to fictional characters, and that model systems 
are representations of physical systems (Frigg [2010]; Thomasson [forthcoming]; Thomson-
Jones [forthcoming]). The direct view posits that model descriptions prescribe imaginings 
about physical systems without the mediation of a model system, and that model 
descriptions are representations of physical systems (Toon [2012]; Levy [2015]). The 
indirect fiction view and the direct fiction view incur different internal problems and, as I 
will argue, they do not successfully explain the representational function of models. For 
these reasons, I will formulate an alternative account, what I call the ‘new fiction view of 
models’. 
In recent years, several different theories of model representations have been 
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4 
developed.1 The fiction view falls under a broad pragmatic account that sees models as 
objects that acquire a representational function when used in certain ways (Bailer-Jones 
[2003]; Currie [2017]; Frigg [2006], [2010]; Giere [2004]; Godfrey-Smith [2006]; Mäki 
[2009]; Parker [2011]; Suárez [2004], [2010]; van Fraassen [2008]).2 While these theories 
disagree on several issues, most of them tend to converge on the recognition of two main 
conditions of adequacy that a model has to satisfy to be a scientific representation of real-
world phenomena, the aboutness condition and the epistemic condition.3 The aboutness 
condition is the condition that an object x has to satisfy to be a representation of a distinct 
object y. The epistemic condition is the condition that an object x has to satisfy to be an 
epistemic representation of a distinct object y, that is, a representation that enables 
knowledge of reality. These conditions raise some particularly difficult problems for the 
fiction view of models. 
Let us focus on the aboutness condition first. Models enable us to learn about reality 
only when they are used as stand-ins for the particular aspects of the world we investigate. 
Without this condition, there would be no representation relation between a model and the 
real-world phenomena we want to understand. This raises an important question: in virtue of 
what does a model represent its target? Frigg refers to this as the ‘enigma of representation’ 
(Frigg [2006], p. 50), Morrison ([2008], p. 70) calls it ‘the crux of the problem of 
representation’, and Suárez ([2003], p. 230) specifically draws attention to the problem of 
                                                
1  See (Frigg and Nguyen [2017]) for a detailed review of these theories. 
2  Pragmatic approaches are sometime also called ‘deflationary’ (Giere [2004]; Knuuttila [2005]; Suárez 
[2010]) or ‘functional’ (Chakravartty [2010]), and are often opposed to ‘strong accounts’ (Knuuttila 
[2011], p. 265) based on some kind of morphism, including isomorphism (da Costa and French [2000]; 
French [2003]; Suppe [1974]; van Fraassen [1980]), homomorphism (Bartels [2006]; Lloyd [1988]), 
and partial isomorphism (Bueno [1997]; da Costa and French [2003]).  
3 In his critical discussion of representationalism, de Oliveira ([forthcoming]) identifies two main 
components of representation, an ontological component and an epistemic component, that correspond 
to the aboutness condition and the epistemic condition respectively.  
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5 
how to understand this particular relation between models and targets. To appreciate the 
importance of the question it is useful to look at how the same problem is raised in the 
different context of pictorial representation.4 When seeing Leonardo’s Monna Lisa, we 
immediately recognize that the painting depicts a woman (Monna Lisa). The painting, 
however, is a flat canvas covered in paint. So, how can it represent anything beyond itself? 
Analogously, models represent solar systems, biological populations, and economies. But 
they are none of these things themselves. Models are equations and descriptions that 
represent other things beyond themselves. How do they do that? Many contemporary 
theories of model representations answer this question by appealing to the notion of 
denotation. Denotation is a dyadic relation between object x (a denoting symbol) and object 
y (a denoted object). According to the DDI (denotation, demonstration, interpretation) 
theory, denotation establishes the representation relation between models and reality 
(Hugues [1997]); some interpretations of the structuralist theory construe the relation 
between models and reality in terms of denotation (Contessa [2007]); the similarity theory 
holds that modellers generate hypotheses that denote targets (Giere [2010]); some versions 
of the fiction view of models posit that representation involves a denotation condition on 
models (Frigg [2010]); and the DEKI (denotation, exemplification, keying-up, imputation) 
account of models recognize denotation as essential (Frigg and Nguyen [2016]).  
These theories also converge on the claim that models are used as the vehicles of 
denotation. That is, models are the symbols standing in the denotation relation with targets. 
Philosophers have largely disagreed on the ontology of models, and hence on the nature of 
the vehicles of denotation. This raises a fundamental challenge to any account of model 
representations: what objects are they and how do we identify them? Call this the 
                                                
4 A similar comparison with pictorial representation is made by Frigg ([2006], p. 50), who points out that 
in the context of pictorial representation, Flint Schier ([1986], p. 1). referred to the same problem as 
‘the enigma of depiction’. 
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6 
‘identification problem’. In the previous paragraph, I said that denotation is a dyadic relation 
between a denoting symbol and a denoted object. Only existing objects can enter into 
relations. This raises a particularly strong version of the identification problem for the 
fiction view of models. According to this view, models are akin to fictional characters. So, 
what sort of objects are they and how can they possibly enter into a denotation relation with 
their targets?  
Now let us move to the epistemic condition. Model representations are objects that are 
studied and developed for the purpose of learning about their targets. This is what makes 
them epistemic representations, namely, representations that facilitate the acquisition of 
knowledge. It is generally agreed that models represent in ways that enable the formulation 
of hypotheses about their targets. For example, Swoyer ([1991]) emphasizes that models are 
surrogate systems that scientists study with the aim of learning about real-world systems; 
Bolinska ([2013]) and Contessa ([2007]) describe models as ‘epistemic representations’; 
Frigg ([2006]) argues that an essential requirement of any theory of model representations is 
that it explains how they enable knowledge of reality; Godfrey-Smith ([2006]) posits that 
models have a distinctive epistemic role in science; Suárez ([2003]) claims that models 
license inferences about their targets; and Weisberg ([2013]) recognizes that the model–
world relation is one that enables knowledge. So, how do models represent in ways that 
facilitate knowledge of reality? Call this the ‘epistemic problem’.  
Many contemporary theories of models, including the ones mentioned above, posit that 
answering the epistemic problem requires the recognition that learning with models involves 
two steps. First, scientists study a model system to elicit new information about its 
properties and generate certain claims about the model system. Second, they convert what 
they have learned about the model system into knowledge of the target system via a set of 
comparative claims based on a relation of similarity. Usually, similarity is spelled out in 
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7 
terms of the sharing of properties in some respects and to certain degrees (Giere [1988], 
[2010]). For example, scientists compare idealized populations and biological populations, 
imaginary economies and real economies, the simple pendulum with physical pendulums, 
and they formulate certain claims about the relevant similarities between them. 
Comparative claims are theoretical hypotheses, which are candidates for truth. But the 
current dispute about the ontology of models raises a particular problem concerning the 
truth conditions of model–world comparisons. Call this the ‘problem of truth conditions’. 
Only concrete objects can have the sort of properties that model systems and target systems 
supposedly share. But model systems are not concrete. On the fiction view, they are merely 
imaginary systems. So, how can they share any properties with any physical systems and 
what would ground the truth conditions of model–world comparisons? 
In what follows, I propose a new solution to the identification problem and the problem 
of truth conditions for model representations. This view remains coherent with the original 
insight of the fiction view and, like the indirect and the direct fiction views, it also draws on 
Walton’s theory of make-believe. However, the new fiction view offers an original analysis 
of model representations and different responses to the identification problem and the 
problem of truth conditions. Concerning the identification problem, the new fiction view 
holds that models are akin to fictional stories, and that it is they (rather than model systems 
or model descriptions) that stand in a representation relation with targets. Concerning the 
problem of truth conditions, the new fiction view develops the Waltonian analysis of 
fictional discourse into an analysis of comparative claims. Furthermore, it recognizes that 
comparative claims can be only true in the context of a game of make-believe, and that the 
ultimate key to the epistemic condition is in the generation of direct attributions that export 
what has been learned about the model into theoretical hypotheses about reality. The new 
fiction view therefore posits that learning with models involves two different kinds of 
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8 
theoretical hypotheses, that is, model–world comparisons and direct attributions. 
The plan of the article is the following: First, I will illustrate how the Waltonian notion 
of make-believe applies to scientific models (Section 2). Second, I will critically discuss the 
indirect view and the direct view (Section 3). Third, I will present the new fiction view of 
models (Section 4), and I will show how this can answer the identification problem and the 
problem of truth conditions (Section 5).  
 
2 Models as Games of Make-Believe 
Walton ([1990]) introduces the notion of a game of make-believe as a social imaginative 
activity involving props and further argues that works of fiction are props in the relevant 
games. Props are ordinary objects that make propositions fictionally true—or f-true—in 
virtue of certain prescriptions to imagine. Fictional truth—or f-truth—coincides with the 
notion of fictionality, which is a property of the propositions that are among the 
prescriptions to imagine of the game. The notion of fictionality is normative and objective to 
the extent that a proposition, p, is fictional when in a certain game it is to be imagined that p, 
independently of whether one actually imagines that p.  
These initial ideas apply to scientific models in the following way. Models involve 
model descriptions—the props—that prescribe imagining that certain fictional systems are 
so and so. Model descriptions can be sentences, graphs, mathematical formulae, and so on. 
Consider, for example, the simple pendulum model, which is often used to represent 
familiar phenomena such as a person moving on a swing or a pendulum clock. The model 
describes the oscillatory movement of a bob suspended by a string. When the bob is 
displaced from its equilibrium position and then released, it oscillates back and forth on the 
arc of a circle with a radius that is identical to the length of the string. The model is usually 
identified with the following differential equation: 
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'
(
sin 𝜃 	= 0. 
 
To be clear, the equation itself is not a model of anything. In fact, a mathematician could 
develop the equation independently of any particular reference to any physical system. The 
equation becomes a simple pendulum model when it is construed as describing a particular 
type of system. That is, when its variables are construed as standing in for certain objects. 
Under the relevant construal, the equation describes the oscillatory motion of a bob 
suspended by a string, where q is the angular displacement, L is the length of the string, and 
g is the restoring force acting on the bob, which is gravity. The differential equation is 
difficult to solve analytically. However, when the amplitude of the angular displacement is 
small (usually when 𝜃/ < 1), the equation effectively provides that of a harmonic oscillator 
and an analytical solution can be easily obtained: 
 
!"#
!$"
	+ 	
'
(
𝜃	 = 0. 
 
To enable this mathematical treatment, the model makes a number of idealizing 
assumptions, including that the string is massless and unstretchable and that the bob is a 
point mass; that the oscillatory motion occurs only in two dimensions (rather than three) and 
therefore that the point mass (the bob) moves along an arc (rather than an ellipsis); that the 
gravitational field is uniform; that motion does not lose energy to friction or to air 
resistance. Of course, these assumptions are false! They do not merely describe a type of 
system (a bob suspended by a string). They describe an imaginary object (a point mass) 
suspended by an imaginary string under imaginary conditions. That is, they describe an 
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10 
imaginary—or fictional—system. We can imagine otherwise if we want, but this does not 
conform to the prescriptions to imagine in force in the model and therefore it is not part of 
the model’s f-truths, which means that it is not part of the model’s content. 
Now we can add another element from Walton’s theory to further explain how the 
model is developed, and hence how we can learn about it. F-truths divide between primary 
f-truths and implied f-truths. Primary f-truths are generated directly from the props. Implied 
f-truths are generated indirectly from the primary f-truths via principles of generation. The 
simple pendulum model is studied and developed by eliciting what is implicitly true in it—
or f-true. This requires going beyond the initial premises through certain principles of 
generation. Following Lewis ([1978]), Walton identifies two principles of generation, the 
reality principle and the mutual-belief principle. The reality principle imports truths about 
the real world into the world of the fiction so as to keep it as close as possible to the real 
world. The mutual belief principle imports the mutual beliefs of the community wherein the 
story was generated into the world of the fiction. However, neither the reality principle nor 
the mutual belief principle is privileged in modelling. We do not import facts from reality 
into the model like we would when imaginatively engaging with a realistic fiction. For 
example, we do not import real physical facts into the model of the simple pendulum (or, for 
that matter, any real facts, including chemical, biological, historical, and more). Instead, 
different principles apply depending on disciplinary conventions and purposes of enquiry. In 
the case we are discussing, the relevant principles are mathematical and they are provided 
by calculus. For example, one can ask: what is the frequency of the bob’s periodic 
oscillations? That is, what is the number of vibrations that the bob makes in one second? 
Through calculus, we get the following equation:  
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𝑓	 = 	
3
45
√
'
(
, 
 
where f is frequency, p is a constant, and the other variables inherit the assignments they had 
in the original equation. What is the period of the bob’s oscillations? That is, how much 
time does the bob need to complete one oscillation? Here again, calculus yields the 
following equation: 
 
𝑇	 = 	2𝜋√
(
'
, 
 
where T stands in for period, the other variables have the same assignments and p is the 
same constant as in the previous equation. To obtain any specific results we need to assign 
specific values to the variables. For example, when L is 1.000 m and g is 9.800 m/s2, the 
frequency, f, is 0.4983 Hz and the period, T, is 2.007 s.5 
In this way one learns about the oscillatory movement of a fictional bob oscillating 
from a fictional spring. That is, one learns about a fictional system. Learning about the 
oscillatory movement of real systems, however, requires exporting what one has learned 
about the fictional system outside of the make-believe and onto reality via the formulation 
of theoretical hypotheses. As I will argue in Section 5, the relevant hypotheses are of two 
kinds, model–world comparisons and direct attributions. The Waltonian analysis of fictional 
discourse will be useful to understand the nature of model–world comparisons and the sort 
of truth conditions they have.  
But before I do that, let me clarify that the Waltonian theory is compatible with both 
realism and anti-realism about fictional entities, and hence also about the imaginary systems 
                                                
5 This example is in (Young and Freedman [2011], p. 455). 
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12 
specified by model descriptions. Imaginings do not have any ontological import and do not 
commit to any fictional entities. Walton ([1990]) dismisses realism because, as I will 
explain below, his analysis offers the theoretical tools to dispense with it. But those who, for 
independent reasons, prefer a realist ontology of fictional entities and model systems can 
endorse the Waltonian analysis without giving away realism.  
 
3 Standard Fiction Views of Models 
In this section, I turn to the two main accounts that occupy centre stage in the current debate 
on models as fictions, the indirect fiction view and the direct fiction view of models.  
 
3.1 The indirect fiction view 
Originally, Godfrey-Smith ([2006], [2009]) presents the indirect fiction view by suggesting 
that model descriptions specify model systems, that model systems are akin to fictional 
characters, and that model systems represent targets. We can distinguish two main versions 
of the indirect view depending upon whether one endorses anti-realism or realism about 
model systems.  
Frigg ([2010]) originally develops the analogy in terms of Walton’s theory of fiction as 
a game of make-believe.6 He submits that model descriptions are props that prescribe 
imagining about model systems, and that model systems are the vehicles of representation of 
targets (what he calls ‘t-representation’); see Figure 1.  
                                                
6 Frigg and Nguyen ([2016]) introduce a version of the indirect fiction view that combines Goodman’s 
([1976]) and Elgin’s ([2010], [2017]) notion of representation-as with the Waltonian account. This 
version shares with the original account the main problems that I will describe below. 
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Figure 1. 
 
Frigg construes model systems as analogous to maps that allow inferring facts about a 
territory from facts about the map through a key translating facts about the map into claims 
about the territory. On his view, ‘X t-represents Y iff: (R1) X denotes Y. (R2) X comes with a 
key K specifying how facts about X are to be translated into claims about Y’ ([2010], p. 
126). (R1) responds to the aboutness condition since it establishes the aboutness of X. (R2) 
responds to the epistemic condition since it establishes the cognitive relevance of X for Y by 
imputing properties of X to Y. Frigg assumes anti-realism about model systems and submits 
that comparing non-existent objects and real objects ‘does not seem to make sense’ ([2010], 
p. 119). He interprets model–world comparisons as comparisons between properties of 
model systems with properties of real systems. On his interpretation, ‘when I say that the 
population of rabbits in a certain ecosystem behaves very much like the population in the 
Fibonacci model, what I assert is that these populations possess certain relevant properties 
which are similar in relevant respects’ ([2010], p. 119).  
This proposal faces four difficulties. First, Toon ([2012], p. 58) notices that if model 
systems do not exist then they cannot denote anything—and this raises the identification 
problem. Second, Toon ([2012], p. 58) and Levy ([2015], pp. 789–90) submit that if model 
systems do not exist they cannot instantiate any properties and therefore there cannot be any 
facts about model systems to be translated into claims about targets. Third, Godfrey-Smith 
([2009], p. 113) argues that since Frigg is suspicious of comparisons between non-existent 
objects and real objects he should also be suspicious of comparisons between uninstantiated 
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14 
properties and real properties. Fourth, I should also emphasize that model–world 
comparisons are candidates for truth, but statements involving apparent reference to non-
existent objects and/or uninstantiated properties cannot be literally true—and this raises the 
problem of truth conditions. 
These problems follow from Frigg’s assumption of anti-realism about model systems. 
Can the indirect view be better off by assuming fictional realism? Thomasson 
([forthcoming]) and Thomson-Jones ([forthcoming]) argue that model systems are best 
construed as abstract artefacts created through the imaginative activities of scientists. This 
responds to the identification problem by positing that model systems are abstract objects 
that represent things beyond themselves. However, Thomasson ([forthcoming]) recognizes 
that abstract objects cannot really have properties such as being a biological population or 
feeding on a prey population. Instead, they can only have such properties within a fictional 
context—or, in Walton’s terms, a game of make-believe. She further accepts Frigg’s 
([2010]) analysis of comparative claims as comparisons between properties. But she 
overcomes Godfrey-Smith’s concern by adding that the existence of these properties can be 
argued for ‘by making pleonastic inferences’—for example, by moving from ‘“The wand is 
not magical” to “the property of magicalness is not possessed by the wand” to infer that 
there is a property of magicalness that the wand (indeed everything) lacks’ (Thomasson 
[forthcoming]). This move, however, does not respond to the problem of truth conditions. 
Even if the relevant properties exist, abstract objects cannot instantiate them. At most, they 
can fictionally instantiate them, or instantiate them within a fictional context. The statement 
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Figure 2. 
 
‘the real rabbit population and the imaginary prey population possess certain relevant 
properties which are similar in relevant respects’ cannot be literally true and the problem of 
truth conditions remains unsolved. 
 
3.2 The direct fiction view 
To avoid the usual controversies surrounding the nature of fictional entities, Toon ([2012]) 
and Levy ([2015]) argue in favour of the direct fiction view of models. On Toon’s original 
version, model descriptions of models with targets prescribe imaginings about concrete 
targets. For example, the model description of the simple pendulum prescribes imagining of 
some concrete pendulum that it is different from the way it really is. Model descriptions of 
models without targets prescribe imagining about fictional systems. For instance, models of 
synthetic molecules that have not been created in a lab prescribe imagining about fictional 
molecules. Models with targets enable philosophers of science to defer controversies 
surrounding fictional entities to philosophers of fiction. Models without targets, however, 
present philosophers of science with the very same controversies. (See Figure 2.) 
More radically, Levy ([2015]) argues that there are no targetless models. He discusses 
three different cases: non-committal models, generalized models, and purely targetless 
models. Non-committal models are ‘meant to apply to a target, but the specific range and 
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features it captures are not known for sure’ ([2015], p. 796). It is only after the target is 
found that the model satisfies the direct account. Generalized models work as hubs 
anchoring specific models. A generalized model has a generalized target (for example, 
population growth in general) and the specific models anchoring to it have particular target 
systems. The direct account ultimately applies to these too. Models of the third type, the 
purely targetless models, ‘are never applied to any target, not even in a generalized or 
roundabout way’ ([2015], p. 797). This is the case that I think poses the greatest challenge to 
Levy’s version of the direct view. Levy considers a few examples put forward by Weisberg 
([2013]) against the direct view, including ‘game of life’ and other cellular automata. He 
submits that one shouldn’t take these cases too seriously because, ultimately, they are not 
real models but bits of mathematics.  
Perhaps Levy is right in rejecting Weisberg’s particular examples. But there are other 
cases that fall under his characterization of purely targetless models and that his version of 
the direct view cannot account for. Consider the following cases. Models of synthetic 
molecules that are never synthesized in a lab, models of three-sex populations that are used 
to explore certain alternative states of affairs, and models of false scientific posits such as 
Maxwell’s model of ether are purely targetless in the sense that they are never applied to 
any targets. One may argue that these models are non-representational, and for this reason 
they would pose no challenge to the direct view. But any theory of model representations 
must allow for the possibility of representation failure. The analogy with linguistic and 
pictorial representations will be useful. The name ‘Lilliput’ is a linguistic representation 
even though it does not represent anything (because there is no Lilliput). And Millais’ 
painting Ophelia is a representation even though there is no Ophelia. Lilliput and Ophelia 
are fictions, and the representations used to describe them are representations that fail to 
represent any real objects simply because there are no such objects. Similarly, models of 
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synthetic molecules, alternative possible systems, and false scientific posits are model 
representations that fail to represent because the corresponding targets do not exist. They are 
purely fictional.7  
Here is a challenge to the idea that the direct view can really avoid controversies 
surrounding fictional entities. Model descriptions, just like the texts of literary fictions, 
involve apparent reference to objects of different kinds, including fictional things (point 
masses, massless strings), fictional populations (infinite populations, prey populations with 
infinite supplies of food), fictional processes (the constant increasing or decreasing of the 
size of some population, a frictionless oscillatory movement), fictional situations or states of 
affairs (a point mass suspended to a massless string, the availability of limitless supplies of 
food). Stating that model descriptions are about real objects does not dispense with fictional 
entities (and the controversies they generate) because model descriptions always involve 
apparent reference to some fictional objects.  
Upholders of the direct view may insist that all they mean is that scientists’ imaginings 
are about real objects. For example, they imagine that the actual string in front of them is 
massless. As a result, the argument goes, there is no need to posit a fictional massless string 
standing between the model description of the ideal pendulum and the world—any more 
than we need to posit new fictional objects every time we give a false description of 
something real. This reply, however, introduces a mismatch between what model 
descriptions prescribe to imagine and what scientists would purportedly imagine. We only 
need to look at the model description of the simple pendulum (Toon’s preferred example) 
given in a standard physics textbook to realize that this does not involve reference to any 
real objects: 
 
                                                
7 For a different discussion of targetless models, see (Currie [2017]). 
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A simple pendulum is an idealized model consisting of a point mass suspended by a 
massless, unstretchable string. When the point mass is pulled to one side of its straight-down 
equilibrium position and released, it oscillates about the equilibrium position. (Young and 
Freedman [2011], p. 453) 
 
The model description of the ideal pendulum is not about any particular pendulum. It does 
not start with ‘Imagine of this particular pendulum in front of you that it is a point mass 
suspended by a massless, unstretchable string’. Rather, it apparently refers to an imaginary 
system consisting of a point mass and a massless string and hence prescribes imagining 
about a fictional system. On a charitable interpretation, one could argue that while the model 
description prescribes imagining about a fictional system, a scientist using the model to 
learn about the oscillatory motion of a physical pendulum in a particular context may also 
imagine of the physical pendulum that is in front of her that it is a point mass suspended by 
a massless string. But this is not what the model description prescribes to imagine. The 
model description is independent of reality. Indeed, it is not a representation of reality. 
Here is a different charitable interpretation. Suppose we give up the claim that model 
descriptions are about concrete individual systems. The direct theorist might claim that 
model descriptions are about certain types (or classes of types) of concrete objects—for 
example, all physical objects that satisfy a certain set of properties specified among the 
prescriptions to imagine of the model. On this interpretation, the model description of the 
simple pendulum would be about all physical systems that can be described as engaging in 
the sort of oscillatory motion specified by the model’s equations. The problem with this 
interpretation is that the model description does not involve any reference to ordinary 
objects, not even as members of a type (or class of types). The model description does not 
say ‘imagine of (or about) all concrete objects that engage in this kind of oscillatory motion 
(the one described by the simple pendulum) that they are a point mass suspended to a 
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massless and unstretchable string’. And it does not say ‘imagine of the abstract type 
including all concrete objects that engage in this kind of oscillatory motion (the one 
described by the simple pendulum) that it is a point mass suspended to a massless and 
unstretchable string’. The model description involves apparent reference to particular 
imaginary objects (a point mass, a massless and unstretchable string) engaging in oscillatory 
motion under imaginary conditions.  
Now let us briefly consider how the direct view addresses the epistemic problem of 
how we learn with models. Toon ([2012], p. 67) suggests that this involves making ‘an 
inference from the model to the system when we take what is fictional in the model to be 
true of the system’. Levy develops a similar idea in terms of Yablo’s ([2014]) notion of 
partial truth, according to which a proposition is partly true if and only if it has parts that are 
wholly true. He suggests that model descriptions are partly true if some of the things they 
say about real systems are true. So, for example, when we consider the ideal gas model we 
evaluate the truth of parts of what the model description says about real gases and ‘we find 
that it is partly true, that is, with respect to the role of the motion of particles; and partly 
untrue, that is, with respect to the role of collisions among particles’ ([2015], p. 794). Real 
gas particles collide all the time, ideal gas particles never collide. This proposal inherits the 
problems mentioned above: model descriptions are not about any real systems and the 
model description of the ideal gas is not about any real gases.  
 
4 The New Fiction View of Models 
In this section I propose an alternative account of model representations, what I call the 
‘new fiction view of models’. Just like the indirect view and the direct view, the new fiction 
view draws on Walton’s theory of make-believe. However, the new fiction view offers a 
different construal of the analogy between models and fictions. Upholders of the indirect 
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fiction view and the direct fiction view respectively identify models with model systems and 
model descriptions. The new fiction view rejects both interpretations and reconceptualizes 
the notion of models as complex objects constituted by model descriptions and model 
contents.  
The fiction view of models was originally motivated by the recognition that scientists 
think and talk about model systems just as ordinary people think and talk about the 
imaginary characters of fiction. The new fiction view recognizes the force of this analogy, 
but it also posits that there is a more fundamental analogy between theoretical models and 
literary fictions. Walton construes works of fiction as games of make-believe. Literary 
works of fiction are the products of an author’s imaginative activity and the objects of an 
imaginative response. Analogously, models are the products of a scientist’s imaginative 
activity and the objects of an imaginative response. The new fiction view departs from 
traditional analyses by holding that the fundamental analogy is between theoretical models 
and literary works of fiction. In this way, the proposal avoids most of the pitfalls of the 
traditional analyses that have been described above and, as I will argue below, it delivers a 
new and better understanding of the face-value practice of modellers and of model 
representations. 
According to the new fiction view, model M is a complex object constituted by model 
description D and content C, so that M = [D, C]. From an ontological point of view, the 
model is analogous to a literary work of fiction; the model description is analogous to the 
text of a fictional story (the prop that prescribes imagining certain f-truths); and the model 
content is analogous to the content of a fictional story (it involves the primary f-truths 
prescribed by the model description and the implied f-truths generated through the principles 
of generation). The model description prescribes imagining about an imaginary system, such 
as a point mass suspended by a massless string. But imaginings do not commit to the 
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existence of any fictional entities and the new fiction view is therefore compatible with anti-
realism about model systems. More precisely, the new fiction view commits to fictional 
anti-realism. On this view, there are no model systems.  
What is the relation between model description and model content? The model, M, is 
constituted by model description and model content, and these are distinct entities that only 
together constitute a particular model. The model description is a set of linguistic and 
mathematical symbols that prescribe particular imaginings under a construal. For example, 
as emphasized in Section 2, the model equation  
 
!"#
!$"
	+ 	
'
(
sin 𝜃 	= 0  
 
is a mere string of mathematical symbols that does not specify any particular f-truths until it 
is interpreted as describing the oscillatory movement of an ideal pendulum. That is, until the 
variables in the equation are interpreted as standing in for certain (fictional) objects (L for 
the length of the fictional string, g for the restoring force acting on the fictional bob). The 
model content is the set of f-truths of the model, including the primary f-truths prescribed by 
the model description and the implied f-truths generated through the principles of 
generation. Thus, the model description alone does not entail the entire model content. 
Model descriptions set the primary f-truths (the model’s initial assumptions), while the 
principles of generation augment these by generating the model’s implied f-truths. 
Furthermore, to a certain extent, model description and model content can vary 
independently of each other. For example, the model description may involve not only 
mathematical symbols (which, we assume, are generally shared through different contexts) 
but also linguistic symbols that may change without changing the content of the model 
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(suppose you have a linguistic description of the ideal pendulum in English and another one 
in Chinese). Different model descriptions can specify the same content under the same 
interpretation or they can specify a different content under different interpretations (suppose 
a mathematician interprets the above equation as purely mathematical, without any 
reference to the oscillatory movement of an ideal pendulum). 
Model descriptions are constitutive parts of models. This, however, seems to lead to the 
absurd consequence that every small change in the model description results in a new 
model. Fortunately, it does not. To explain this, I will rely on a distinction that has been put 
forward to avoid a similar objection to the syntactic view of theories.8 The syntactic view of 
theories claims that theories are constituted by descriptions, that is, sets of sentences. The 
syntactic view, however, is not committed to the claim that sentences provide identity 
criteria for a theory. To understand this, we need to distinguish between theory and theory 
formulation. A theory is what a particular set of sentences expresses and the same theory 
can be expressed by different sets of sentences. A theory formulation is the particular 
expression of a theory through a particular set of sentences and sets of sentences provide 
identity criteria for theory formulations. As a consequence, any change in any given 
sentence results in a different theory formulation (a different set of sentences). Providing 
identity conditions for theories is more difficult and it goes beyond the scope of this article. 
But it is worth pointing out that several alternatives have been developed over the past 
decades, including definitional equivalence (Glymour [1970]), intertranslatability (Quine 
[1975]), and sameness of truth conditions (Hendry and Psillos [2007]).9 Further work is 
needed to investigate how each of these different criteria could be used to provide identity 
                                                
8 See (Suppe [2000]) for an overview of the key steps of this debate. 
9 See (Barrett and Halvorson [2015]) for a recent critical discussion of Glymour’s ([1970]) and Quine’s 
([1975]) proposals. See (Thomson-Jones [2012]) for an idea about models that is similar to the one 
defended by Hendry and Psillos ([2007]). 
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criteria for models having syntatically different yet theoretically equivalent descriptions. But 
it should be clear that construing model descriptions as constitutive of models does not 
entail absurd identity conditions because they do not provide identity conditions for models. 
Principles of generation, obviously, are also independent of model description and 
model content. They depend upon the particular interpretative practices and traditions in 
which a scientist works. Principles of generation in models are poorly understood. As 
mentioned in Section 2, they can be of different types. Mathematical principles, theoretical 
principles, and some restricted versions of reality orientation are at work in different 
models. So, for example, Bechtel and Abrahamsen ([2010]) consider computational models 
in chronobiology and cognitive science and argue that computational models of circadian 
rhythm are grounded in empirical discoveries, while computational models in neuroscience 
typically do not involve direct empirical evidence but rather generate indirect evidence that 
a certain mechanism may adequately produce particular behavioural data. This implies that 
some types of models (in chronobiology) may be constrained in a reality-oriented way for 
the derivation of certain implied f-truths and are categorized as realistic models. Some other 
models (in computational neuroscience) are less constrained by reality-orientation and 
therefore are categorized as less realistic. The divide between realistic and unrealistic 
models presents a fruitful opportunity to study the limits of reality-orientation and the 
further constraints that may operate on these different types of models. But exploring these 
limits will have to be the goal of another article. 
The new fiction view develops a natural analogy between fictional models and fictional 
stories that preserves the original idea that scientists think and talk about model systems in 
ways that are similar to how ordinary people think and talk about the imaginary objects of 
fiction. This view can also deliver a better account of the face-value practice of modellers 
coherently with fictional anti-realism. In the rest of this section, I will focus on two key 
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aspects of the practice: the attribution of properties to model systems, and the ability to think 
and talk about them.  
How can modellers attribute properties to model systems if there are no model systems? 
An answer to this question can be offered in terms of model content. When scientists seem 
to attribute properties to model systems, they really make claims involving the predication 
of certain properties. They say things like, ‘the bob is a point mass attached to a massless 
string’ or ‘the bob does not lose energy to friction’. These claims can be assessed as true in 
the model if they are part of its content. Indeed, eliciting the model’s secrets, learning about 
its features, comes down to discovering new f-truths by drawing the inferences that correctly 
follow from the model’s primary f-truths together with the principles of generation.  
Model descriptions prescribe imaginings that seem to be about some particular system 
(the model system). However, the new fiction view assumes fictional anti-realism and holds 
that there are no model systems. This raises the following question: how can model 
descriptions prescribe imaginings about model systems if there are no such systems? This is 
one of the main worries raised by upholders of the direct fiction view against the anti-realist 
version of the indirect fiction view. But if one thinks carefully about it, it will immediately 
emerge that this is just a particular instance of the more general problem of the 
intentionality—or object-directedness—of mental states. Realists about intentionality argue 
that every mental state that seems to be directed at some object is really directed at an object 
and they offer different accounts of what this object could be (Meinong [1960]; Thomasson 
[1996], [1999]). Anti-realists about intentionality argue that not every mental state that 
seems to be directed at some object is really directed at an object (Friend [2011], [2014]; 
Sainsbury [2010]; Salis [2013]). Imagining a unicorn does not require that there really is a 
unicorn one is imagining. Analogously, imagining a point mass and imagining a massless 
string do not commit one to the existence of some particular point mass and massless string 
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as the objects of those imaginings. In other words, thinking ‘about something’ does not 
automatically commit one to its existence.  
Many contemporary anti-realists about intentionality appeal to the idea of a mental file 
to explain the phenomenology of thoughts apparently directed at objects that do not exist. 
Mental files are akin to the folk psychological notion of the concepts one has of particular 
objects. A mental file is a cognitive structure for the storage of information that one takes to 
be about some object independently of whether the object exists or not.10 This information is 
usually identified with a list of predicates expressing properties that one takes as satisfied by 
a particular object. The information contained in the mental file, however, does not identify 
the file itself. Information stored in a mental file can be retrieved, updated, and deleted at 
any time without changing the identity of the file. Indeed, information stored in a mental file 
can be subjective and idiosyncratic to the extent that different individuals can list different 
information in their mental files for the same object.  
Let me illustrate these ideas with an example. A team of engineers working on 
improving the stability of a particular bridge produces a project. The project is constituted 
by a set of descriptions (sentences, graphs, blueprints, notes, sketches) expressing a certain 
content. The city mayor, who needs to approve the project, gathers information about the 
bridge (such as structural features, building materials, existent damages) that is conveyed 
through the content. The mayor stores information that she takes to be about the bridge in a 
mental file and that is supposed to match the project content. However, she does not realize 
that, for example, the bridge has trusses built from structural steel and that it has a smaller 
beam connecting two cantilevers.  
                                                
10 Philosophers of mind and language originally introduced this notion under the label ‘dossier’ (Grice 
[1969]) and later introduced the term ‘mental file’ (Perry [1980]). Cognitive psychologists appeal to 
the same notion to theorize about belief representation in infancy (Perner et al. [2015]), and to the 
similar notion of object concepts to theorize about object representations in infancy (Carey [2009]). 
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Now let us change the example a little bit. Suppose that the team is designing a new 
bridge that does not yet exist. A project constituted by a set of descriptions expressing a 
certain content is produced and the mayor receives the project for approval. She reads the 
project and, as in the previous case, opens a mental file to store information that she takes to 
be satisfied by a particular bridge, the one that the engineers are designing. But there is no 
bridge that this information is really about. The bridge has not been built yet. 
From a cognitive point of view, the two cases look very much alike. In the first case, 
the project involves a description expressing a certain content that induces a mental file 
about a particular bridge. In the second case, the project involves a description expressing a 
content that induces a mental file that seems to be about a particular object without being 
about any real object. In the former case, we have genuine aboutness. In the latter case, we 
have only the appearance of aboutness. For lack of a better word, I will call the latter 
‘imagined-aboutness’. The same cognitive resources (mental files) are deployed in both 
cases. In the first case, the mayor acquires and stores information that she takes to be about 
a particular object, and since there is a real object there is also genuine aboutness. In the 
second case, the mayor acquires and stores information that she takes to be about a 
particular object. But there is no such object and hence there is only imagined-aboutness.  
Something similar to the latter happens with models. When one studies the simple 
pendulum model one gathers information from the model content (the primary f-truths and 
the implied f-truths) that is stored in a mental file for the simple pendulum. For example, 
coherently with the model content, one imagines that the bob is a point mass attached to a 
massless string. By doing this, one acquires information that seems to be about some 
particular bob (the one described in the model) without there being any such bob. Indeed, 
one gathers information that one imagines to be about some particular bob that the model 
describes. This information is stored in a mental file containing the predicates that one takes 
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to be satisfied by the model bob. Among these are predicates that are involved in the 
primary f-truths of the model (being a point mass and being attached to a massless string), 
and among the implied f-truths of the model (having a frequency of 0.4983 Hz when the 
length of the string is 1.000 m and gravity is 9.800 m/s2). But the competent model user 
includes also further information deriving from the predicates that characterize, or define, a 
point mass (being a geometric zero-dimensional point and having zero volume). Of course, 
one may also get the model content wrong. In this case, the information stored in a mental 
file for the model bob will have to be amended or deleted. Finally, it is worth noticing that 
the mental file is the subjective and psychological component of a scientist’s individual 
imaginative engagement with the model. Hence, mental files contribute an explanation of 
the phenomenology of the modelling practice without being among the model constituents. 
Let us take stock. The new fiction view develops a new analogy between models and 
fictions by reconceptualizing the notion of a model as akin to a literary work of fiction. On 
this view, the model is not the model system (as per the indirect fiction view) or the model 
description (as per the direct view). Rather, the model is the model description together with 
its content. Model description and model content are independent entities that together 
constitute a model. A model description is a set of symbols (mathematic, linguistic, 
pictorial) that expresses a particular content under an interpretation and that does not enter 
into the identity conditions of the model. The model content is composed of the primary f-
truths prescribed by the model description and the implied f-truths of the model governed by 
the principles of generation. Furthermore, the new fiction view can explain the attribution of 
properties to model systems in terms of the predication of the same properties involved in 
the model content. And it can explain the apparent aboutness of scientists’ discourse and 
thought about model systems in terms of the mental files that they deploy when 
imaginatively engaging with models. In this way, the new fiction view can offer a full 
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explanation of the face-value practice of modellers without committing to the existence of 
any exotic entities. 
 
5 Answering the Identification Problem and the Problem of Truth Conditions 
With these new tools we can now address the identification problem concerning models as 
the vehicles of denotation and the problem of truth conditions concerning the theoretical 
hypotheses generated through models.  
In Section 3, I noted that standard versions of the fiction view face different issues with 
respect to the identification problem. On the anti-realist version of the indirect fiction view, 
model systems do not exist yet they are supposed to stand in the denotation relation between 
models and targets. Given that denotation is a dyadic relation, this generates the odd 
consequence that denotation can only be pretend denotation. Upholders of the direct fiction 
view avoid this problem by arguing that it is not model systems, but rather model 
descriptions that are the vehicle of denotation standing in the relevant relation with targets. 
Model descriptions exist, hence there could be genuine denotation. However, as I argued in 
the same section, model descriptions do not denote any real systems and hence cannot 
directly denote any targets.  
The new fiction view avoids both problems of systematic denotation failure and thus 
solves the identification problem by reconceptualizing the notion of model. On this view, 
the vehicle of denotation is the model, M, which is constituted by the model description, D, 
and the model content, C. In other words, it is M, and not the model system or the model 
description, that stands in the denotation relation with the target.11 The model thus defined 
                                                
11 In this respect, the new fiction view differs from Currie’s ([2017]) identification of models with their 
descriptions (which he also calls their ‘vehicles’). On the new fiction view, a model is constituted by 
its model description and its propositional content. It is this complex object that is the vehicle of the 
representation relation between models and reality. 
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exists and therefore can stand in the denotation relation with real world systems. This novel 
version of anti-realism about model systems identifies models with objects that are akin to 
fictional stories. The model description exists: it is the set of sentences and mathematical 
symbols that are akin to the texts of fictional stories. They are the props that prescribe 
imagining certain propositions, the primary f-truths of the game of make-believe. These 
primary f-truths are then further integrated with the implied f-truths derived from the 
primary f-truths through the principles of generation. Together, they constitute the 
propositional content C of the model. On the assumption that propositions also exist, the 
whole model M exists. And M is the object that enters into the denotation relation with 
targets.  
The new fiction view can also respond to the problem of truth conditions by building on 
Walton’s analysis of fictional discourse. Standard accounts posit that learning with models 
involves two steps. First, scientists manipulate and develop a model to learn about its 
features and generate claims about it. Second, they transfer what they have learned about the 
model into knowledge of reality via a set of comparative claims based on a relation of 
similarity between the model system and the target. However, model systems cannot share 
any properties with physical systems. So, how can model–world comparisons be true? To 
better understand this further step, I will appeal to one important distinction that Walton 
makes between two kinds of games of make-believe, authorized and unofficial. Authorized 
games are constrained by the prescriptions to imagine of the game, including those 
prescribed by the model descriptions and those generated through the principles of 
generation. Unofficial games are constrained by ad hoc rules of generation. I will illustrate 
this distinction in what follows. 
Scientists make claims that seem to be about model systems and when they do this, 
they engage in what I call ‘model reports’. For example, when studying the simple 
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pendulum model, we can say ‘the point mass is attached to a massless string’. Such an 
utterance is a move within an authorized game of make-believe for the simple pendulum 
model because it conforms to the model’s prescriptions to imagine. The utterance can be 
construed as an instance of one of two different types of discourse about fiction: intra-
fictional discourse or meta-fictional discourse. Intra-fictional discourse involves a 
perspective that is internal to the authorized game of make-believe of the model. Utterances 
produced in intra-fictional discourse are pseudo-assertions, that is, speech acts that look like 
assertions (they have a declarative form and seem to describe certain facts), but they have 
fictional truth conditions (rather than genuine truth conditions) and the attitude the speaker 
has towards their content is imagination (rather than belief).  
Meta-fictional discourse involves a perspective that is external to the game of make-
believe, and therefore to the model. In this case, the claim is really about the model (M). Its 
content is based on the model content, but it is broader than that. The content includes 
genuine reference to the model and it is better rephrased as, ‘according to M, the point mass 
is attached to a massless string’. This proposition can be assessed for genuine truth, because 
it is stating a fact about the model (it is reporting features of the model by identifying one of 
its constitutive propositions). Utterances produced in meta-fictional discourse are genuine 
assertions, they have genuine truth conditions (rather than fictional truth conditions), and the 
attitude the speaker has towards their content is belief (rather than imagination). Notice, 
however, that meta-fictional discourse ultimately depends on intra-fictional discourse and 
therefore intra-fictional discourse is more fundamental than meta-fictional discourse. We 
could not report features of the model without knowing what propositions are among the 
prescriptions to imagine and the implied f-truths that are constitutive of its content. 
These considerations extend to model–world comparisons but for a few crucial 
elements. The first difference between model reports and model–world comparisons is that 
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the former are moves within authorized games while the latter are moves within unofficial 
games, namely, games that are constrained by ad hoc rules of generation. Consider the 
comparative claim: ‘the dynamic oscillation of a real pendulum is approximately similar to 
the dynamic oscillation of the simple pendulum’. The claim is literally false because it 
involves apparent reference to an imaginary system, the simple pendulum, that does not 
exist. On the internal reading, such a claim is assessed within an unofficial game that 
includes information about the dynamic oscillation of a real pendulum and the dynamic 
oscillation of the imaginary pendulum. On the external reading, the same claim is really 
about the unofficial game implied by comparing the dynamic oscillation of the real 
pendulum and the dynamic oscillation of the imaginary pendulum. On the external reading, 
the claim is therefore construed as embedded within operator U (standing for the unofficial 
game): ‘according to U, the dynamic oscillation of a real pendulum is approximately similar 
to the dynamic oscillation of the simple pendulum’. The original claim, without operator U, 
was only true in the unofficial game of make-believe. The paraphrased claim embedded in 
operator U is genuinely true because it is a description of the unofficial game of make-
believe U.12  
The second important difference between model reports and model–world comparisons 
concerns the sort of epistemic justification involved in the two cases. The sort of epistemic 
justification that a scientist has when uttering a model report in intra-fictional discourse 
derives from the model content. A particular claim (and a particular imagining) in model 
reports is justified if and only if the objective f-truths of the model provide good evidence 
for that particular claim. That is, one’s imaginings are justified if and only if they conform 
to the prescriptions established by the model description and the principles of generation in 
                                                
12 Similar considerations apply to comparative claims involving quantification over degrees of properties 
and mathematical entities on a measurement scale. 
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force in the particular context of use. The sort of epistemic justification one has when 
assessing the truth conditions of model reports in meta-fictional discourse involves evidence 
that is provided by the model itself. The truth conditions of model–world comparisons, 
however, are constrained by prescriptions to imagine concerning features of the model 
system and features of the real systems they are about. The claim ‘the dynamic oscillation of 
a real pendulum is approximately similar to the dynamic oscillation of the simple pendulum’ 
must be assessed with respect to the model’s prescriptions to imagine and with respect to 
reality. If real systems do not show the same sort of dynamic oscillation that is (fictionally) 
instantiated by the simple pendulum, then the comparative claim will be false.  
But is there a way to step out of the make-believe and formulate theoretical hypotheses 
that do not involve any reference to the imaginary entities of models? The answer is 
positive, and it involves the recognition of a second type of theoretical hypotheses that is 
also generated within the modelling practice. This type of theoretical hypotheses is gained 
through make-believe but are exported outside of the make-believe in the form of a direct 
attribution to real world systems of the properties involved in the model content. Thus, a 
scientist can say things like, ‘for small angular displacements q, the restoring force on the 
bob of a real pendulum is approximately simple harmonic’. This claim is a theoretical 
hypothesis that is exclusively about reality and that can be tested.  
The generation of direct attributions can be explained with the amended version of 
Frigg’s notion of an interpretation key. According to the new fiction view, a key is a rule for 
converting claims about model systems into claims about targets. When the key is identity 
or approximate similarity the imagined properties of model systems and the real properties 
of targets can only be fictionally identical or approximately similar. That is, they can only 
be identical or approximately similar within a game of make-believe, and hence we can only 
have imagined identity or imagined similarity. A scientist can export properties P1…Pn from  
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Figure 3. 
 
model content C as claims about reality by stepping out of the game and attributing the same 
properties to a real target. To do this, she will have to predicate these very properties of the 
target. An interpretation key is therefore nothing other than a principle of exportation of f-
truths as claims about reality that can be tested for genuine truth. The key enables to export 
an f-truth outside of the game of make-believe for the simple pendulum model into a claim 
about a real corresponding fact about real pendulums (see Figure 3).  
 
6 Conclusion 
In this article, I developed the new fiction view as a novel account of how models represent 
in ways that enable learning about reality. To this aim, I drew on Walton’s theory of fiction 
as a game of make-believe, which naturally combines with fictional anti-realism, the view 
that there are no fictional entities and therefore that there are no model systems. I argued 
that neither the indirect fiction view nor the direct fiction view successfully addresses the 
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problem of identification and the problem of truth conditions. I reconceptualized the notion 
of a model by building on the analogy between models and fictional stories and explored the 
ways this view can be developed to explain some important aspects of the face-value 
practice of modelling. After this, I advanced a response to the identification problem that 
starts from the recognition that models as complex entities composed by model descriptions 
and model content are the only possible vehicles of denotation. And I answered the problem 
of truth conditions by recognizing that model–world comparisons can be analysed as moves 
in unofficial games of make-believe. This motivated the recognition of a second type of 
theoretical hypotheses, namely, direct attributions of model properties to their targets. Direct 
attributions are one step away from the make-believe, yet they can only be formulated 
through a necessary detour in make-believe. The upshot is that the representation function of 
scientific models involves a denotation relation between models (construed in the above 
way) and the world, and the formulation, in make-believe, of two main types of theoretical 
hypotheses, model–world comparisons and direct attributions.  
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